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Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16 (Oct. 1, 2009)1
 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW – TORTIOUS DISCHARGE AND AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT  
 
 Consolidated appeals considering two issues: (1) whether to recognize a new exception to 
the at-will employment doctrine and to allow a claim for tortious discharge related to an employee’s 
termination for attempting to organize his fellow employees; and (2) whether the district court 
abused its discretion in its resolution of respondents’ request for attorney fees and costs. 
Summary 
 
 The Court answered the first question in the negative, declining to recognize a claim for 
tortious discharge because the appellant had an available federal statutory remedy.  As to the second 
question, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of respondent’s motion for attorney’s fees, 
but reversed in part the district court’s cost award. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Ozawa was employed part-time and at-will as a pilot for Vision Airlines and Vision 
Aviation Holdings (collectively, Vision Airlines).  During the time of his employment, Ozawa took 
a leadership role in petitioning for additional compensation for pilots required to attend training 
sessions.  Shortly thereafter, Ozawa was contacted by Vision Airlines’ director of human resources 
and, though the parties dispute the details, he subsequently resigned. 
Factual and Procedural History 
Ozawa filed a complaint in district court alleging retaliatory discharge, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and breach of contract.  The district court dismissed the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim and granted summary judgment to Vision Airlines on the remaining 
claims of retaliatory discharge on the grounds that such a claim is not recognized by Nevada law 
and of breach of contract because Ozawa was an at-will employee.  The district court subsequently 
denied a motion for reconsideration and denied in part and granted in part a motion by Vision 
Airlines for attorney fees and costs. 
Ozawa appealed the order granting summary judgment to Vision Airlines.  Vision Airlines 
cross-appealed from the attorney fees and cost order.  The Nevada Supreme Court consolidated 
these appeals. 
 
The Ozawa Appeal:  Summary Judgment was proper as Ozawa failed to avail himself of an 
available remedy in federal court 
Discussion 
An employer can dismiss an at-will employee with or without cause, so long as the dismissal 
does not offend Nevada’s public policy.2  While the Court has recognized certain exceptions to the 
at-will employment doctrine3, these exceptions are limited to cases where the employer’s conduct 
violates a “strong and compelling public policy.”4
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2 State v. Dist. Ct. (Anzalone), 118 Nev. 140, 151, 42 P.3d 233, 240 (2002). 
3 See D’Angelo v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 704, 719, 819 P.2d 206, 216 (1991) (adopting an exception based on Nevada 
public policy favoring “safe employment practices and the protection of the health and safety of workers on the job”). 
4 Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 105 Nev. 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (declining to create an exception to at-will 
employment doctrine for age discrimination). 
Ozawa argued that NRS 614.0905, NRS 613.2206, and the National Labor Relations Act7, 
established a strong public policy in Nevada to protect workers’ right to organize in order to 
enhance or protect the condition of their employment.  However, the Court noted that mere 
identification of public policy is not the entire analysis, and as the Court explained in D’Angelo, the 
court will not recognize a claim for tortious discharge when an adequate statutory remedy already 
exists.8  Because the Federal Railway Labor Act9 provides a federal remedy, and because the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes a private right of action under the Act10
 
, the Court concluded 
Ozawa had an adequate remedy that he did not avail himself of, and therefore the Court affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his claim for tortious discharge. 
The Vision Airlines Appeal:  The district court’s attorney fees and costs award 
 Regarding the attorney fees, the Court reviewed the district court’s analysis of the four-
factor test set forth in Beattie v. Thomas.11
 Regarding award of costs, Vision Airlines argued that the district court erred by (1) 
awarding costs to Vision Airlines based on an original, as opposed to amended, memorandum of 
costs; and (2) improperly granting Ozawa $723.45 in set-off costs based on a claim by Ozawa of 
accrued vacation and paid time off.  The Court, noting that Ozawa did not dispute the first claim, 
supplemented Vision Airlines award of cost based on the amended memorandum of costs.  As to the 
second issue, the Court concluded it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to reduce its 
award of costs to Vision Airlines because the district court had already granted Vision Airlines 
summary judgment on all causes of action in Ozawa’s complaint.   
  After analyzing the record in the case, the Court 
concluded that proper consideration was given to each factor and the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to award Vision Airlines attorney fees. 
 
 Because Ozawa failed to avail himself of an available statutory remedy, the Court affirmed 
the district court’s summary judgment and declined to recognize a tortious discharge claim for the 
alleged termination of Ozawa’s employment with Vision Airlines based on his efforts to organize 
his coworkers.  Further, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to award attorney fee.  However, the Court reversed and remanded, as an abuse of 
discretion, the district court’s refusal to amend Vision Airlines’ award of costs by reinstating the 
$723.45 off-set costs and adding on the difference of the amended memorandum of costs and 
disbursements. 
Conclusion 
                                                            
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 614.090(1) (2007) (declaring as the public policy of Nevada that “it is necessary that the individual 
workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint or 
coercion of employers… in self organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.220 (2007) (providing that no part of NRS Chapter 613 “shall be construed to restrict or 
prohibit the orderly and peaceable assembling or cooperation of persons employed in any profession, trade or handcraft 
for the purpose of securing an advance in the rate of wages or compensation or for the maintenance of such rate.”). 
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935). 
8 D’Angelo, 107 Nev. at 720, 891 P.2d at 217. 
9 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006). 
10 See Fennessy v. Southwest Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1996).  
11 Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983) (In awarding attorney’s fees, the court must 
review: (1) whether the plaintiff brought the claim in good faith; (2) whether the defendants’ offer of judgment was 
reasonable and in good faith in both amount and timing; (3) whether it was grossly unreasonable or an act of bad faith 
for the plaintiff to reject the offer and proceed to trial; and (4) whether the fees sought are reasonable and justifiable). 
